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It is never an easy decision to take an individual who is left with little or no cognition off 
of life support.  The decision becomes even more difficult when that individual is pregnant.  The 
decision to take a pregnant woman who has suffered a catastrophic brain injury off of life 
support raises various medical, legal, and ethical issues and implications.  If an issue like this 
were brought to the Supreme Court, there are simply no cases to help the Court reach a sound 
decision on the matter.  None, that is unless the Court examines the constitutional privacy 
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.   
 3 
There are two important decisions to be made when a pregnant woman becomes 
incapacitated: whether to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, and whether to terminate their 
fetus.  Both of these issues have been adjudicated extensively by the Supreme Court.  Moreover, 
both the right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment and the right to an abortion are privacy 
interests.  Despite the fact that these rights are recognized separately, there is an overlap between 
the two rights, and this overlap makes it possible for the Supreme Court to create a standard by 
which a constitutional right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from an incapacitated pregnant 
woman can be recognized.   
This article examines the different concerns that need to considered before the Supreme 
Court can reach a conclusion regarding the right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from an 
incapacitated pregnant woman.  Part I discusses the scenario itself.  It includes examples of this 
phenomenon, a discussion of the medical considerations at play, and an examination of the 
possibility of a successful pregnancy in pregnant women who are incapacitated.  Part II involves 
a constitutional analysis of this scenario.  This includes a brief outline of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions regarding abortion and the right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, a discussion 
concerning what autonomy means, and an example of one court’s decisions when faced with an 
issue regarding the scenario at issue.  Finally, Part III proposes a standard for the Supreme Court 
to use in order to properly acknowledge the right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from an 
incapacitated pregnant woman.  Part III further discusses the various concerns at play based on 
the proposed standard and discusses why the proposed standard is constitutional. 
I. PREGNANCY AND CATASTOPHIC BRAIN INJURIES 
When a pregnant woman suffers a catastrophic brain injury, her family and her doctors 
must decide whether to accept or withdraw life-sustaining treatment.  These decision makers face 
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both the decision of whether to prolong the patient’s life, and the decision of whether to end a 
pregnancy.1  Although this situation is rare, the following instances are examples of this 
scenario, and they each demonstrate the complexities that come with the decision of whether to 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a pregnant woman.   
In 2013, Marlise Munoz, a resident of Texas, was fourteen weeks pregnant when she suffered 
a sudden blood clot in her lungs which resulted in brain death.2  Marlise’s family told the 
hospital to stop treating her because Marlise had previously expressed  that she never wanted to 
be kept on life support.3  The hospital decided not to comply with the family’s wishes, since a 
Texas law prohibited doctors from cutting off life support from a pregnant patient.4  Marlise’s 
family brought suit, and Marlise remained on life support until the Texas court reached a 
decision.5  The court determined that the Texas state statute did not apply to Ms. Munoz since 
she was legally dead, and ordered the hospital to take her off life support.6  The judge did not 
make a determination on the constitutionality of the law.7   
In 2014, another woman suffered a catastrophic brain injury, but unlike Munoz, her family 
decided to keep the baby.  Robyn Benson was twenty-two weeks pregnant when she was 
 
    1 Feldman, supra note 11, at 710. 
    2 Shea Flanagan, Decisions in the Dark: Why “Pregnancy Exclusion” Statutes are Unconstitutional and 
Unethical, Northwestern L. Rev., 2020, at 970.  
    3 Id. 
    4 Manny Fernandez and Erik Eckholm, Pregnant, and Forced to Stay on Life Support, The New York Times, Jan. 
7, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/us/pregnant-and-forced-to-stay-on-life-support.html. 
    5 Wade Goodwyn, The Strange Case of Marlise Munoz and John Peter Smith Hospital , NPR, January 28, 2014, 
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2014/01/28/267759687/the-strange-case-of-marlise-munoz-and-john-
peter-smith-hospital. 
    6 Id. 
    7 Flanagan, supra note 2, at 971-72 (“However, the judge made no determination about whether this Texas law 
was constitutional as applied to pregnant patients in a persistent vegetative state who have previously communicated 
their end-of-life wishes to remove life support in this condition”) 
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declared brain dead.8  Her husband made the decision to keep her on a ventilator until the fetus 
could be delivered via Cesarean section.9  Doctors hoped she could carry the fetus until her 
thirty-fourth week of pregnancy.10  Instead, Robyn’s body only persisted for six weeks, and a 
healthy baby was delivered on week twenty-eight of her pregnancy.11  The baby was healthy but 
had to be kept in the neonatal intensive care unit.12   
In 2015, Karla Perez was twenty-two weeks pregnant when she was declared brain dead.13  
Her family asked that she be kept alive as long as possible until the baby could be delivered.14  
The Methodist Health System in Nebraska was able to keep her alive for almost eight weeks, and 
her baby was delivered weighing only two pounds.15  The doctors at this hospital had very little 
research to work from, since there were no documented cases of this phenomenon at their 
hospital.16  In their research, the doctors only found thirty-three cases of incapacitated pregnant 
women since 1982.17  Because of this lack of information, the doctors had to work off of their 
general knowledge of medicine and brain death in order to stabilize Perez.18  The doctors had 
hoped to keep Perez alive until she reached thirty-two weeks, but her condition deteriorated at 
thirty weeks.19  Her baby was stable at birth and was kept in a neonatal intensive care unit.20  
 
    8 Brij Charan, Brain-Dead Canadian Woman Dies After Giving Birth to Boy, NBC News, Feb. 11, 2014, 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/brain-dead-canadian-woman-dies-after-giving-birth-boy-n27741. 
    9 Id. 
    10 Id. 
    11 Id. 
    12 Id. 
    13 Elahe Izadi, Woman Delivers Baby 54 Days After Being Declared Brain Dead , The Washington Post, May 1, 
2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/05/01/a-brain-dead-woman-was-kept-alive-
for-54-days-to-deliver-her-baby/. 
    14 Id. 
    15 Id. 
    16 Id. 
    17 Id. 
    18 Id. 
    19 Id. 
    20 Id. 
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 The previous examples involved brain dead mothers, but this dilemma also arises when 
mothers are in a persistent vegetative state.  In 2018, a woman in Arizona had been in a 
persistent vegetative state for over ten years.21  She was sexually assaulted while being cared for 
at Hacienda Healthcare in Phoenix, and became pregnant.22  Since she was in a persistent 
vegetative state, her body could function, but cognitively all human qualities were gone.23  She 
could not communicate to her family or her doctors that she was pregnant.24  Therefore, the 
pregnancy could only be recognized through secondary changes on her body.25  After one month, 
a doctor finally discovered the pregnancy.26  The family was informed of the pregnancy, and 
despite the sexual assault, her parents decided not to terminate the pregnancy.27  She gave birth 
to a premature yet healthy boy in 1996.28   
A. Diagnosing Severe Brain Injuries 
 
It is important to know how physicians diagnose and categorize severe brain injuries before 
discussing the implications of these injuries for pregnant women.  A necessary diagnosis is 
whether a patient is considered to be brain dead or is in a vegetative state.  Historically, the 
traditional standard for determining death was based on cardiopulmonary functions.29  Physicians 
relied solely on a loss of circulatory and respiratory function in order to prove someone was 
dead.30  When medical technology advanced and physicians used life support on their patients 
 
    21 Elizabeth Chuck, Pregnancy in Women in Vegetative States is Rare, but not Unprecedented , NBC News, Jan 
12, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/pregnancy-women-vegetative-states-rare-not-unprecedented-
n957611. 
    22 Id. 
    23 Id. 
    24 Id. 
    25 Id. 
    26 Id. 
    27 Id. 
    28 Id. 
    29 See Ben Sarbey, Definitions of Death: Brain Death and What Matters in a Person , Journal of Law and the 
Biosciences, Nov. 20, 2016, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5570697/. 
    30 Id. 
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more extensively, the definition of death changed to include both the cardiopulmonary approach 
and a new brain-based approach.31  People could now be declared “dead” if they had no brain 
functioning at all, but continued to breathe and have a heartbeat.32  In 1980, the Uniform 
Determination of Death Act (“UDDA”) was published as the model statute for determining 
death.33  The UDDA declared as dead an individual with either an “irreversible cessation of 
circulatory and respiratory functions” or an “irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire 
brain.”34  This brain-based standard under the UDDA for loss of cessation of the entire brain is 
known as “brain death.”35  Someone who is brain dead is considered legally and clinically dead 
with no chance of revival, and are only kept on life support for certain situations such as organ 
donation.36 
 Besides brain death, brain injuries can also place someone in a vegetative state, and these 
situations also lead to inquiries regarding whether to continue life support.  There are a few 
important differences between brain death and a vegetative state, but both conditions have 
presented similar significant challenges in cases of maternal brain injuries during pregnancy.37  
First, brain death is legal death, but a vegetative state is not considered legal death because these 
patients maintain some cognitive functioning.38  Unlike brain dead patients, patients in a 
vegetative state can regulate their breathing and heart rate without assistance.39  Patients in a 
 
    31 Id. 
    32 Id. 
    33 Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA).  The UDDA does not discuss rules on maintaining life support 
beyond brain death in cases of pregnant women. 
    34 UDDA § 1. 
    35 UDDA. 
    36 Brain Death vs. Persistent Vegetative State: What's the Legal Difference?, FindLaw, May 29, 2018, 
https://healthcare.findlaw.com/patient-rights/brain-death-vs-persistent-vegetative-state-what-is-the-legal-
difference.html. 
    37 Deborah M. Feldman, et al., Irreversible Maternal Brain Injury during Pregnancy: A Case Report and  Review 
of the Literature, CME Review, 2000, at 708. 
    38 Brain Death vs. Persistent Vegetative State, supra  note 10. 
39 Id. 
 8 
vegetative state have depressed consciousness, but are unaware and only exhibit some signs of 
wakefulness.40  If a person is in a vegetative state for a significant period of time and it is “highly 
unlikely” they will live beyond the vegetative state, this patient is then diagnosed as being in a 
persistent vegetative state.41  Many people often contend that a persistent vegetative state is a 
“state worse than death.”42  Physicians must make thorough evidence-based prognoses for brain-
injured patients to ensure any clinical decisions about life support are well informed.43 
B. Success Rates 
Catastrophic brain injuries in pregnant women are uncommon, but when they occur, they 
create a complicated situation.  A fetus can sometimes survive after keeping the mother on life 
support, but this success is not guaranteed and a decision to keep women on life support for their 
fetus involves numerous considerations.44  General research on the topic, however limited, can 
aid in these decisions.  Moreover, the general length of time doctors sustain patients on life-
support can be indicative of how long a pregnancy in this state could be sustained.  Finally, the 
survival rates of babies who are placed in the neonatal intensive care units should be considered, 
since, as seen in the examples above, the babies born from incapacitated mothers are often 
premature.  
 
    40 Douglas S. Diekema, et al., Session 15. Brain Death, Permanent Vegetative State, and Medical Futility , 
American Academy of Pediatrics, 2017, at 119, https://www.aap.org/en-us/Documents/Bioethics-BrainDeath.pdf. 
    41 Brain Death vs. Persistent Vegetative State, supra  note 10. 
    42 James L. Bernat, Ethical Issues in the Treatment of Severe Brain Injury: The Impact of New Technologies , 
Disorders of Consciousness, 2009, at 121. 
    43 Id. at 118-20 (In order to diagnose a brain injury, physicians perform numerous tests to “determine the extent of 
the injury.  These tests include EEGs, CT and MRI scans, clinical examinations that are repeated over time in 
intervals, testing responses to stimuli.  These texts can show if a  patient is brain dead or in a vegetative state, as well 
as if a  patient is transitioning out of a vegetative state.”). 
    44 Christopher M. Burkle, et al., Medical, legal, and ethical challenges associated with pregnancy and 
catastrophic brain injury, International Journal of Gynecology and Obstetrics, 2015. 
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  The number of weeks a mother is pregnant can help establish whether a child has a realistic 
chance of survival.45  A 2010 study conducted research about thirty cases of brain dead pregnant 
women from 1982 to 2010.46  In this study, the mean age of the injured mother was 26.5 years, 
while the mean pregnancy was 22 weeks.47  The mean week of delivery was 29.5 weeks.48  A 
full-term pregnancy is normally forty weeks.49  The study showed that only twelve viable 
neonates were born and survived past the neonatal period.50  In a different study of forty-three 
cases from 1976 to 2015, however, there was one trial where the mother became incapacitated at 
six weeks, but the baby still managed to be delivered and progress to a healthy state.51  There are 
currently no regulations to define at what week of pregnancy a mother should be kept on life 
support for the child to be delivered.52   
Recall that when a person is brain dead they are legally dead.  So, it is impossible to keep 
such a person “alive” with life support.  Despite this truth, doctors have managed to successfully 
keep these people on life support for a significant period for certain purposes.53  Among these 
purposes are organ donation and allowing the family of the deceased more time to say 
 
    45 Iwona Pikto-Pietkiewicz, et al., The Management of a Thirteen Weeks Pregnant Woman Rendered Brain -Dead 
Following a Ruptured Aneurysm, The Journal of Critical Care Medicine, Aug. 9, 2019, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6698076/. 
    46 Id. 
    47 Burkle, supra note 19. 
    48 Id. 
    49 Jaime Rochelle Herndon, How Long is a Full-Term Pregnancy, About, Inc., Sept. 24, 2020, 
https://www.verywellfamily.com/what-does-it-mean-to-have-a-full-term-pregnancy-4174638. 
    50 Id. 
    51 Id. 
    52 Id. 







goodbye.54  Another purpose, as denoted in the examples above, could be to keep a fetus 
incubated in the mother’s body long enough for a successful delivery.55  In the cases of brain 
death, successfully keeping a body on life support is feasible but not certain.56  There are several 
factors to consider.  Patients on life support no longer have a heartbeat, so a ventilator is needed 
to keep the heart beating.57  Kidney and gastric functions can only continue for about a week 
with a ventilator, so a doctor must administer medication for these processes.58  Normal blood 
pressure cannot be maintained, so medicine must be provided to maintain it.59  Also, brain dead 
individuals cannot maintain their body temperature, so doctors must maintain this temperature 
through blankets, warm IVs, or by heating a room.60  Although many treatments are necessary to 
keep a brain dead patient on life support, these treatments could theoretically keep a brain dead 
body functioning for a long time.61  For example, as explained supra, brain dead mothers have 
been kept alive for weeks for their fetuses.  In fact, in one fascinating example, a teenage girl, 
Jahi McMath, was kept on life support for almost five years.62  This happened after the religious 
beliefs of her mother brought the matter to court, and the judge ruled to extend Jahi’s life 
support.63   
As noted above, people in a vegetative state are still partially “alive,” and are not considered 
legally dead.  This is because of medical differences between brain death and a vegetative state.  
 
    54 Id. 
    55 Id. 
    56 Id. 
    57 Id. 
    58 Id. 
    59 Id. 
    60 Id. 
    61 Id. 
    62 Kat Chow, Jahi McMath, Teen At Center Of Medical And Religious Debate On Brain Death, Has Died , NPR, 
June 29, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624641317/jahi-mcmath-teen-at-center-of-medical-and-religious-
debate-on-brain-death-has-di. 
    63 Id. 
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Unlike brain death, those who are in a vegetative state can still maintain certain functions on 
their own, and sometimes have a chance at revival.  These patients can often regulate their 
breathing and heart rate without assistance.64  So, successfully keeping these people alive 
involves more standard supportive care, such as providing adequate nutrition through a feeding 
tube, administering physical therapy, and preventing disease or infection.65   
Additionally, the survival rate of babies in the neonatal intensive care unit is an important 
consideration since babies born to mothers on life support are often premature.  Based on the 
American Academy of Pediatrics 2017 study, the one-year survival rate for babies admitted to 
the neonatal intensive care unit was seventy-four percent.66  The survival rate increased with 
each week of pregnancy, with only eighteen percent success at twenty-two weeks, twenty-nine 
percent at twenty-three weeks, fifty-six percent at twenty-four weeks, eighty-four percent at 
twenty-five weeks, and ninety percent success at twenty-six weeks.67  Thus, based on these 
statistics, the baby is only more likely to survive than die starting at the twenty-fourth week of 
pregnancy.68 
C. Medical Decision-Making Process for Incapacitated Patients 
Since incapacitated patients lose the ability to make health-care decisions for themselves, a 
designated decision maker must work with doctors to make any medical decisions on the 
 
    64 Nicoletta Lanese, Not Brain Dead: Patient Trapped in Vegetative State by Unethical Doctors, Live Science, 
Oct. 08, 2019, https://www.livescience.com/man-kept-in-vegetative-state-for-year.html. 
    65 Id. 
    66 Hans Jorgen Stensvold, MD, et al., Neonatal Morbidity and 1-Year Survival of Extremely Preterm Infants, 
American Academy of Pediatrics, March 2017, 
https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/early/2017/02/20/peds.2016 -1821.full.pdf. 
    67 Id. 
    68 Id. 
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patient’s behalf.69  These decision makers are called “surrogates,” and physicians have a duty to 
obtain consent for all treatment or testing for which they would have needed the original 
patient’s consent if they had capacity.70  Surrogates require adequate information, or information 
that a reasonable person would need to make a clinical decision.71   Surrogates can be appointed 
formally by the patient themselves when they still have capacity, by statute where a lawful 
surrogate is chosen from a list of family members, or informally through the designation of a 
physician.72  Surrogates often make decisions based on the actual patient’s autonomy.73  In doing 
so, the surrogates apply the patient’s perspectives and values to reproduce the decision the 
patient would have made, which can be anticipated from general knowledge about the patient or 
specific conversations.74   
D. Advance-Care Planning and the “Pregnancy Exclusion” 
Sometimes, a patient may provide guidelines before they lose capacity through advance care 
planning.75  Examples of guidelines that are used in advance care planning are advance 
directives, or “living wills. 76  These are often written documents that designate a patient’s 
treatment preferences based on a their understanding of their diagnosis, the burden of each 
treatment, and any possible outcomes of each treatment.77  Advance directives and living wills 
 
    69 Bernat, supra note 17, at 122 (Noting that medical decisions require informed consent, and that a brain-injured 
patient does not lose the right to informed consent.  The surrogate of the patient is transferred this right of informed 
consent, and becomes the decision maker for the patient.  “The informed-consent doctrine requires three conditions 
to make a patient’s consent valid: (1) the patient has the capacity of make and communicate health -care decisions; 
(2) the patient is given and understands the information that is necessary to make an informed and rationa l decision; 
and (3) the patient is not coerced by people or agencies, and thereby can make the decision freely.”).  
    70 Id.  at 122-23.  
    71 Id.  at 123; see also Feldman, supra note 11, at 710 (“Extensive counseling and education regarding the patient 
should be given to the family so they can make an informed decision about life support.”).  
    72 Bernat, supra note 17, at 123. 
    73 Id.  
    74 Id. 
    75 Bernat, supra note 17, at 126. 
    76 Id. 
    77 Id. 
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are created when a patient is ill and the patient expects they may need further treatment.78  For 
example, some patients who create advance directives for themselves expect they may eventually 
become incapacitated. 
There are some present legal obstacles that limit the use of a surrogate or an advance 
directive in the case of pregnant and incapacitated patients.79  Although surrogates and advance 
directives help make decisions for incapacitated patients, they cannot be used unless the statutory 
criteria are met.80  One legal obstacle for pregnant women is that some states exclude pregnant 
women from using advance directives or living wills, and this is often called the “pregnancy 
exclusion.81”  The rationale behind this could likely be that when women draft these documents, 
they are not thinking about how their preferences would change if they became pregnant.82  Also, 
these statutes often are in place to protect the rights of incapacitated pregnant women.83  This is 
because a woman may have used these documents to direct doctors not to use life-sustaining 
treatment, but the women may not have considered how this preference would change if they 
became pregnant.84  Currently, thirty-six states have statutes that either prohibit or restrict 
physicians from honoring a patient’s advance health care directives to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment if they become pregnant.85 
 
    78 Id. 
    79 Katie Rinkus, The Pregnancy Exclusion in Advance Directives: Are Women’s Constitutional Rights Being 
Violated?, Loyola Pub. Interest L. Reporter, October 6, 2014, at 97. 
    80 Id.  at 96. 
    81 Elizabeth Villareal, Pregnancy and Living Wills: A Behavioral Economic Analysis, The Yale Law Journal, Apr 
8, 2019, https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/pregnancy-and-living-wills. 
    82 Id. 
    83 Id. 
    84 Id. 
    85  Flanagan, supra note 2, at 971-72 
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
As can be seen in the cases of Marlise Munoz, Robyn Benson, and Karla Perez, and as noted 
earlier in this paper, there are two difficult decisions to be made when a pregnant woman is on 
life support: the decision of whether to remove life-sustaining treatment, and the decision of 
whether to terminate a fetus.  These decisions represent a collision between two heavily 
adjudicated constitutional rights of the mother.  The first recognized right is the constitutionally 
protected right to refuse medical treatment.86  This includes the right to choose to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment for incapacitated patients.87  The second recognized right is the 
constitutional right to choose an abortion.88  Interestingly, both of these rights have been 
recognized by the Supreme Court as privacy rights safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.  Further, these rights are currently grounded in the belief that there are 
certain constitutional rights central to preserving individual autonomy.89    
A. The Right to Terminate a Pregnancy 
The Supreme Court has recognized the right to an abortion as a fundamental privacy right 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, which is rooted in the protection of individual 
autonomy.   Roe v. Wade was the first pivotal case for abortion rights.  This case was brought to 
the Court as a challenge to a Texas law that prohibited abortions, and the claim was that the law 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment..90  In examining this challenge, 
the Court stated that any rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment’s zone of privacy 
 
      86 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
    87 Id. 
    88 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
    89 Compassion in Dying v. Washington , 79 F.3d 790, 800 (9th Cir. 1996) (“In examining whether a liberty interest 
exists in determining the time and manner of one's death, we begin with the compelling similarities between right-
to-die cases and abortion cases.”). 
    90 Roe, 410 U.S. at 119. 
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were those rights that are deemed “fundamental.”91  The court determined the right to choose to 
have an abortion was “fundamental,” and therefore is included in the guarantee of personal 
privacy from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.92   
Roe was eventually reaffirmed by the Supreme Court’s holding in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey.   In Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion, the Court held that it reaffirmed Roe’s 
“essential holding.”93  The Court acknowledged the zone of privacy and recognized that “the 
Constitution places limits on a State’s right to interfere with a person’s most basic decisions 
about family and parenthood. . . .”94   The Court in Casey referred to the right to choose as a  
“liberty” guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.  The Court described this right to choose as 
central to the preservation of individual autonomy.95  The Court reasoned that a mother’s right to 
an abortion should not be interfered with, since women possess a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest in controlling their “reproductive lives,” which included the intimate and personal 
decision to terminate a pregnancy.96  The Court also introduced an undue burden standard when 
balancing the government’s interests at stake against the mother’s right to choose.97  Under this 
standard, a state’s regulation was improper if it placed an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to 
choose an abortion.98  In other words, the regulation is improper if it “has the purpose or effect of 
 
    91 Id.  at 153. 
    92 Id.  at 152. 
    93 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
    94 Id.  at 849; see also Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 663 (“The fundamental liberties protected by [the Due Process 
Clause] include most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights . . . In addition, these liberties extend to 
certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that 
define personal identity and beliefs.”). 
    95 Casey, 505 U.S. at 857. 
    96 Id.  at 851 (“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, 
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
    97 Id.  at 874. 
    98 Id.  at 877. 
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placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”99  
As established by abortion jurisprudence, there are some choices that are central to a person’s 
autonomy, which are protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.100     
B. The Right to Choose to Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health established the right to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment in incapacitated patients as a privacy interest covered by the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.  Cruzan came to the court because the parents of Nancy 
Cruzan, a young woman in a persistent vegetative state, wished to withdraw her life support, 
which the Missouri hospital refused to do without a court order.101  Cruzan was incompetent, and 
Missouri required “clear and convincing evidence” of a patient’s prior wishes that they would 
have wanted the life support be withdrawn.102  In determining the rights of Cruzan, the Court 
referred to the right to refuse medical treatment as a privacy interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which, as in Casey, is based on the notion of individual autonomy.103  Prior case 
law had held that competent individuals had a constitutional right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment, and now this refusal extended to incapacitated individuals.104  Any regulation of this 
right to refuse medical treatment would only be upheld if the regulation, when balanced against 
the patient’s interest, served an important state interest.105  The Court found that Missouri had a 
valid and compelling interest in preserving human life, and therefore upheld Missouri’s “clear 
 
    99 Id.  at 877. 
    100 Id.  at 844.  (Noting that two general rights under which abortion rights are justified are the right to make 
family decisions and the right to physical autonomy.) 
    101 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266-68. 
    102 Id.  at 269. 
    103 Id.  at 279; see also Id. n.7 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-195 (1986).) (“Although many state 
courts have held that a right to refuse treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we 
have never so held. We believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a  Fourteenth Amendment liberty 
interest.”). 
    104 Id.  at 271. 
    105 Id.  at 279. 
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and convincing evidence” standard because the standard acted to further that interest.106  The 
court held that hospitals must only defer to the patient’s wishes in order to maintain individual 
autonomy in connection with the zone of privacy.107 
C. What is Autonomy? 
As mentioned above, certain rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause are central to the preservation of individual autonomy.  The current conceptualization of 
autonomy is that autonomy helps to establish a zone of privacy and noninterference with the 
decisions of individuals.108  The general principle of autonomy means that each person has 
control over his or her body and life.109  It basically establishes that we should let people do what 
they want to do, including any choice to refuse medical treatment.110  For competent adults, 
autonomy usually prevails.111  For incompetent individuals, however, the effect of autonomy is 
less clear, because it would seem that decision-making autonomy requires awareness on the part 
of the particular individual.  But, as established in Cruzan, autonomy usually prevails even for 
incompetent individuals unless there is a substantial enough countervailing state interest.112   
D. University Health Services v. Piazzi 
Piazzi is an example of a case that assessed the constitutionality of the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment from an incapacitated pregnant woman.  In this case, the hospital sought to 
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keep Donna Piazzi on life support to preserve the life of her unborn child.113  Donna Piazzi was 
brain dead, and her husband requested that the hospital withhold the life-sustaining treatment.114  
Her husband was not the biological father of the child, however, and the biological father 
requested the hospital maintain life support for Piazzi.115  Piazzi was twenty weeks pregnant, and 
it was shown that there was a reasonable possibility that the body could remain functioning until 
a viable fetus could be delivered.116  The court ultimately held that the constitutional privacy 
rights Piazzi possessed were extinguished by her death, including the right to abort a fetus.117 
III. PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD 
 
As noted, both the right to choose an abortion and the right to choose to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment have been recognized by the Supreme Court as privacy rights safeguarded 
by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  This constitutional overlap is heightened 
by the fact that both of these rights are currently grounded in the belief that there are certain 
constitutional rights central to preserving individual autonomy.  Based on this overlap, it is 
possible that there is also a constitutionally protected privacy right to accept or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment from an incapacitated pregnant woman.   
A proposed standard, which could be adopted by the Supreme Court for these scenarios, is to 
recognize that an incapacitated pregnant woman still has privacy interests at stake.  Under such a 
standard, the surrogate decision-maker must defer to the pregnant woman’s wishes on whether to 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment while pregnant.  This decision requires the surrogate to prove 
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by clear and convincing evidence exists that the decision they make is consistent with the 
incapacitated woman’s prior wishes regarding the administration of life-sustaining treatment 
while she is carrying a fetus.  There are various considerations at play, however, in order for this 
standard to pass constitutional muster, and these will be discussed below.   
A. Clear and Convincing Evidence 
In order to adopt a constitutional standard for the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment 
from an incapacitated pregnant woman, clear and convincing evidence of the patient’s prior 
wishes must exist.  Recall that the Court in Cruzan upheld Missouri’s standard that clear and 
convincing evidence of a patient’s prior wishes was necessary in order to take an incompetent 
patient off of life support.  The Court did not hold that this standard must be used, however, and 
left it to the states to determine what standard they would use to prove that a patient would have 
decided to refuse the treatment.118  States can choose from three potential standards of evidence 
to prove that a patient would have refused medical treatment: (1) preponderance of the evidence; 
(2) clear and convincing evidence; or (3) beyond a reasonable doubt.119  The typical standard of 
proof in civil cases is the preponderance of the evidence standard, which simply means “more 
likely than not.”120  When applied to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, this standard 
would require that it is more likely than not that the incompetent patient would have decided to 
accept or withdraw treatment based upon the available evidence.121  The beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard is the highest standard of proof, and so is usually used in criminal cases.122  The 
clear and convincing evidence standard is the intermediate standard of proof, falling somewhere 
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between preponderance of the evidence standard and beyond a reasonable doubt.123  Clear and 
convincing evidence is usually used in cases involving rights that are more substantial, both on 
an individual and societal level.124  The predominant standard courts use to address withdrawal 
of life-sustaining treatment is the clear and convincing evidence standard .125   This standard is 
appropriate here since the Supreme Court has recognized the right to withdraw life-sustaining 
treatment and the right to end a pregnancy as more substantial rights worthy of greater 
consideration. 
B. Substituted Judgment 
Under the proposed standard, surrogates cannot use substituted judgment to make a decision 
regarding life-sustaining treatment for an incapacitated pregnant woman, and therefore must rely 
solely on clear and convincing evidence of the patient’s prior wishes.  Surrogate decision-makers 
are often allowed to use substituted judgment to make healthcare decisions on behalf of an 
incompetent patient.126  This standard directs the decision-maker to act on behalf of the 
incapacitated patient based on their understanding of what the patient might have chosen.127  
Although this seems similar to what is being achieved by the clear and convincing evidence 
standard in Cruzan, the Court in Cruzan rejected the use of substituted judgment in cases 
involving the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment because it deferred to what the patients 
themselves would’ve wanted .128  This was because the court did not think that, constitutionally, 
decisions regarding a privacy right protected under the Due Process Clause should be made by 
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anyone but the patient themselves.129  So, although surrogates become the decision-makers, they 
are not entitled to exercise the will of the patient.130  They are only entitled a rebuttable 
presumption that they are the preferred decision-maker, but their decision must be based on clear 
and convincing evidence that a the patient would have chosen to exercise their right to accept or 
refuse life-sustaining treatment.131   
C. Rights After Death 
 
The court in Piazzi was incorrect in holding that constitutional privacy rights were 
extinguished by death, including the right to abort a fetus.  The court in Piazzi ruled this way 
because the pregnant patient in that case was brain dead.  The Court in Cruzan did not rule this 
way, since the patient in that case was in a vegetative state.  Still, however, the holding in Piazzi 
does not seem consistent with the precedent set by Cruzan.  This is because even though the 
patients were in these different states, they both lacked the cognitive functionality to decide 
things for themselves, and a standard based on clear and convincing evidence would be 
applicable to both.   
Some argue that the holding of Piazzi is true, and constitutional rights are diminished once 
someone is incapacitated.132  But, as in Cruzan, courts have held that certain rights exist after 
death, acknowledging that the dead can have interests that survive death.133  For example, the 
attorney-client privilege survives death, a celebrities’ right of publicity can survive death, and 
reproductive autonomy in cases of frozen sperm or embryos survive death.134  In the cases of 
 
    129 Id. at 286. 
    130 Cipriani, supra note 127, at 720-21. 
    131 Id. 
    132 Seema K. Shah, Piercing the Veil: The Limits of Brain Death as a Legal Fiction , University of Michigan 
Journal of L. Reform, 2015, at 335.  
    133 Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, Hofstra L. Rev., 2009, at 774.  
    134 Shah, supra note 133, at 336. 
 22 
frozen sperm and embryos, courts have held that a decedent has an autonomy interest in how the 
sperm or embryo will be used.  Similarly, there is likely an autonomy interest in the right to an 
abortion which can also survive death.  Reproductive rights are “deeply personal,” and should 
survive death.135  Also, pregnant women who are incapacitated have an almost “symbolic 
existence,” meaning they are arguably more than just a corpse due to the life growing inside 
them.136  Therefore, their rights might hold more value than someone who is also incapacitated 
yet not pregnant.   
Besides this, a court should honor the mother’s right to choose since courts have 
acknowledged that the purpose of allowing this right to choose was to allow women to control 
their own destinies.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg had said that abortion should be legal so 
women can control their own destiny, “and participate equally in the ethical and social life of the 
nation.”137  This argument is very compelling, but in the case of incapacitated pregnant mothers, 
there is no longer a destiny for them.  Even though the mother is incapacitated, however, 
requiring clear and convincing evidence of her prior wishes still allows her to have control over 
her destiny.  This is because this evidence depends on what she would have chosen for herself.138  
The decision-makers for the incapacitated person have to defer to that person’s wishes, and the 
incapacitated woman is therefore still in control of her own destiny.   
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In the proposed standard, the viability of the fetus is not taken into account, but this does not 
make the standard unconstitutional.  Casey held that a state could not enact regulation that results 
in an “undue burden,” or a substantial obstacle in the path of the woman seeking an abortion 
before the fetus attain viability.  Based on this framework, it would seem that an incapacitated 
woman’s prior wishes should only be respected if the fetus has not yet attained viability. For 
example, some commentators have argued that the right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment 
from an incapacitated pregnant woman should be based on the following schema: (1) pre-
viability, the woman’s right to choose should be respected; and (2) post-viability, the 
government’s interest in preserving the life of the fetus trumps any interest the mother would 
have had, and the woman’s right to choose does not necessarily have to be respected.139  This 
standard made sense in the abortion cases when the mother was still alive, but it does not make 
sense when a woman is incapacitated for a variety of reasons. 
Casey established that it was constitutional to outlaw abortions after the point at which a 
fetus becomes “viable.”  This was discussed in a framework where a mother was alive, and the 
fetus was growing in a natural way.  In contrast, If the mother is incapacitated, the right to 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment trumps viability concerns.  The right to withdraw treatment is 
a constitutional right, making it more substantial to the consideration than viability, which was a 
secondary facet of the jurisprudence of abortion.  This is partially because if not for life support, 
the fetus would have died along with the mother.  The mother is simply serving as an incubator 
for the fetus inside her while on life-support.140  Also, as previously established, the rights of the 
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incapacitated mother are the only rights a court must consider when deciding whether to remove 
life-sustaining treatment.  The fetus has no rights, since the right of a fetus have never been 
recognized by the Supreme Court.141  In fact, the Court has stated that for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the definition of “person” does not encompass fetuses.142  The fetus’s 
death would merely be an adverse result of withdrawing life support, which is much different 
from the explicit choice to terminate the child in abortion cases while the mother is still alive.143    
E. Success Rates 
 
 Another reason why requiring clear and convincing evidence of the mother’s prior wishes 
is a constitutional standard is because, even if the government has an interest in the preservation 
of the fetus, it is not definite that the fetus would have a good chance at survival. As established 
in the Part I of this paper, there is little known about the chances of survival for a fetus born from 
an incapacitated pregnant woman as too few cases of the phenomenon exist.  Also, the potential 
to keep someone’s body functioning on life support is possible but not definitive.  There are a 
tremendous number of treatments that need to be administered to brain dead patients to keep 
their bodies functioning, and quite a few for patients in a vegetative state as well.144  Also, as 
mentioned in the Part I, babies born to incapacitated mothers are often premature and are placed 
in the neonatal intensive care unit.  The survival rates of these babies is only greater than fifty 
percent after reaching the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy.145  At twenty-four weeks, a fetus is 
considered “viable.146”  So, if a mother suffers a catastrophic brain injury in the second week of 
her pregnancy that results in brain death, she will need to be kept on life-support for twenty-two 
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weeks or more for her baby to have a greater chance at survival than death.  This is risky, comes 
with tremendous costs, and could potentially result in birth defects or abnormalities even if the 
pregnancy is successful.147  In the examples from Part I, Karla Perez persisted for almost eight 
weeks, Robyn Benson persisted for almost six weeks, and the girl at Hacienda Healthcare in 
Phoenix lasted for several months.  Still, their babies were all born prematurely.    
F. The Pregnancy Exclusion 
 
One potential result of the proposed constitutional standard is that it would overcome the 
hurdles pregnant women face due to “pregnancy exclusion” statutes.  As mentioned in Part I, 
pregnancy exclusion statutes exclude pregnant women from using advance directives or living 
wills.148  Often, these exclusions are in place to protect the rights of incapacitated pregnant 
women, and currently thirty-six states have statutes that either prohibit or restrict physicians from 
honoring a patient’s advance health care directives to refuse life-sustaining treatment if they 
become pregnant.149  The proposed standard recognizes a privacy interest in the right of 
incapacitated pregnant women to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.150  In doing so, this 
standard could render “pregnancy exclusion” statutes unconstitutional.  Advance directives or 
living wills could then serve as partial evidence of a woman’s prior wishes regarding life-
support.  Also, the proposed standard could influence doctors and hospitals to include decisions 
regarding pregnancy in templates for advance directives or living wills, allowing women to have 
greater decision-making power should they become incapacitated.  
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Part II recognizes that the right to an abortion and the right to withdraw life-sustaining 
treatment are constitutional privacy interests, and that these interests exist because they are 
central to the preservation of individual autonomy.  Autonomy helps to establish the zone of 
privacy that encompasses these rights.  Moreover, the Supreme Court’s recognition of autonomy 
shows it is often a determinative factor in whether something can be a constitutionally protected 
privacy interest.  The proposed standard for the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is central 
to the preservation of individual autonomy for a couple of reasons.  First, as mentioned in Part II, 
autonomy means that a person should be able to make their own choices.151  Here, deferring to 
the prior wishes of the incapacitated patient based on clear and convincing evidence of those 
wishes preserves the right of this patient to have control over their body, despite losing the 
capacity to choose.  Second, the principle of autonomy means that each person should have 
control over their own body.152  By allowing clear and convincing evidence of a patient’s wishes 
regarding the fetus to trump any government interest in preserving the life of the fetus, autonomy 
will have prevailed, and the patients will still able to have control over their bodies even after a 
loss of cognition.  
CONCLUSION 
 
 In this analysis, I have attempted to define and discuss the medical practices surrounding 
situations where pregnant women suffer catastrophic brain injuries and are rendered either brain 
dead or in a persistent vegetative state. I have also discussed the related privacy interests 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and have noted how the right to 
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an abortion and the right to withdraw life sustaining treatment are both constitutionally protected 
rights. Finally, I have offered the conclusion that because of the overlap between these two 
rights, there is a potential standard for the Supreme Court to adopt in cases where pregnant 
women are rendered incapacitated that is constitutional and defers to the interests of the patients 
themselves.  The proposed standard recognizes the privacy interests of the incapacitated women 
and requires surrogate decision-makers to make decisions based on clear and convincing 
evidence of a woman’s prior wishes regarding the acceptance or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment with the knowledge that she is carrying a fetus.  Mercifully, it is a standard that will 
not likely find application in a large number of cases, but for those cases in which such a 
standard is needed it will provide a measure of clarity and justice for which we might all be 
thankful.   
